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STUDENT NOTES

Implied Revocation of Wills In West Virginia
"A man may as oft as he will make a new testament, even unto

his last breath, neither is there any cautel under the sun to prevent
this liberty, but no man can die with two testaments, and, therefore

the last and newest is of force so that if there were a thousand
testaments, the last of all is the best of all and maketh void the
former." Thus wrote Swinburn, one of the earliest writers on

wills.2 That the last is "best" and voids all prior wills is now a
principle followed in a minority of jurisdictions in the United
I Kearns v. Roush, 106 W. Va. 663, 667, 146 S.E. 729, 730 (1929);
SwintruN ox TESTAMNTS, § 14. Formerly the word "testament" referred
exclusively to the final disposition of personal property. This interpretation
carried over to the United States in some jurisdictions. See Wyers v. Arnold,
347 Mo. 413, 147, S.W.2d 644 (1941); Aubert's Appeal, 109 Pa. 447, 1 Aft.
336 (1885). Today, however, the common usage is to employ the words
"testament," "will," and 'last will and testament" interchangeably. Occidental
Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937).
25 HoLDswortTH, HIsTORY oF ENGLISH LAW 14 (1924). Holdsworth
states that Swinburn's text was the most practically useful book of the period,
having been first published in 1590.

[57]
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States.' The West Virginia and more prevalent view is that a
subsequent will revokes a prior instrument in toto only when
totally inconsistent with the prior testament.4 Subsequent testaments may, of course, alter previous wills in part, and numerous
problems are raised as a consequence.
This paper will investigate the implied revocation of wills doctrine under West Virginia law. The Virginia statutes, the basis of
the West Virginia statutes, and the Kentucky statutes, also a child
of the Virginia statutes, will be considered along with the case
law interpreting such statutes. The West Virginia cases are considered in chronological order. Due to the inextricable relationship
of revocation and revival, the revival statutes of the above jurisdictions must be considered to a certain extent.
At the formation of West Virginia, many Virginia statutes were
adopted verbatim, or with minor changes. This is the case with
those to be discussed. The Virginia statutes regarding revocation
and revival were modeled after a combination of the English Statute
of Frauds' and the Statute of Victoria.6 The latter was enacted to
clarify the confusion which existed in revocation of personal "testaments" and real "wills" in the ecclesiastical and common law courts.
The desired end, uniformity of interpretation of all testamentary
instruments, was thus easily achieved in Great Britain; but West
Virginia, Virginia, and Kentucky, though substantially adopting
the English statutes,' have failed to adopt uniformly the English
interpretation.
The West Virginia statute pertaining to revocation reads:
"No will or codicil, or any part thereof shall be revoked, unless
...
by a subsequent will or codicil, or by some writing declaring
3
Pugh v. Perryman, 257 Ala. 187, 58 So.2d 117 (1952). A prior will is
held revoked by the mere execution of a subsequent will unless such later will
expressly
negates such intention. See Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 11 32 (1958).
4
lKearns v. Roush, supra. Syllabus No. 1: "A second will duly executed
by the testator as his last will and testament, will revoke a prior will without
express terms declaring the same revoked, where the provisions of the second
instrument make a different disposition of the entire estate from that made
by the prior will."
5 Malone's Adm'r. v. Hobbs, 40 Va. (1 Rob.) 346, 385 (1842); Statute
of Frauds,
1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § § 6, 22.
6
Wills Act, 1937, 7 Win. 4 & 1 Vic. c. 26, § 20.
7
Francis v. Marsh, 54 W. Va. 545, 557, 46 S.E. 573, 578 (1904),
wherein the court, in referring to the difference in our statute stated: "[I]t
is fair to assume ... that there was no intention to alter the sense of section
22 of 1 Victoria ch. 26 in so adopting it in different language and condensed
form.,"
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an intention to revoke the same, and executed in the manner in
which a will is required to be executed, or by the testator, or
some person in his presence and by his direction, cutting, tearing,
burning, obliterating, canceling, or destroying the same, or the
signature thereto with the intention to revoke." (Emphasis
added.) 8
The statute appears to anticipate implied revocation. The distinction made between a "subsequent will or codicil" and "some
writing declaring an intention" makes such interpretation plausable.
West Virginia first considered the problem of implied revocation
in an 1869 case, Carpenterv. Miller's Exrs.9 The court proceeded
on the common law theory of implied revocation, failing to mention
the above statute. In this case, testator executed a will, and subsequently a codicil thereto. The will gave the residue of his property
to A and B and appointed them executors. The codicil, on the
other hand, "requested" A and B to give the proceeds thereof to
the "propogation of the Gospel in foreign lands." The bequest, or
request, in the codicil was held void for uncertainty in the devisee,
and the wording therein insufficient to revoke the will. Thus the
property passed to A and B by the residuary clause of the will.
At this point it would appear that implied revocation was excluded
-the validly executed codicil having no effect, and the will being
allowed to stand. However, the court by dictum stated:
"It is well settled that a second will, inconsistent with the
first, perfect in its form and execution, but incapable of operating
as a will on account of some circumstance dehors the instrument
may nevertheless be set up as a revocation of the first.""0
8

W.

VA. CODE

ch. 41, art. 1, § 7 (Michie 1961). This statute is the

same as that of Virginia except that the word "and" following the italicized
words is omitted from the Virginia statute. VA. CODE § 64-59 (Michie 1950).
Kentucky has the same statute differing in the matter of organization. Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN.§ 394.080 (1963).
The elipses of the quotation are in place of the words "under the preceding
section." The preceding section is W. VA. CODE ch. 41, art. 1, § 6 (Michie
1961), which reads: "Every will made by a man or a woman shall he revoked
by his or her marriage, except a will which makes provision therein for
such contingency, or a will which, though not making provision for such
contingency, is made in exercise of a power of appointment, when the estate
thereby appointed would not, in default of such appointment, pass to his or
her heirs, personal representative or next of kin." Virginia formerly had the
same provision, but it was repealed in 1956. VA. CODE § 64-58 (Michie Supp.

1964). Kentucky has a similar provision. Ky.
(1963).
93 W. Va. 175 (1869).

REv. STAT.

ANN. § 394.090

'Old. at 180. The court cites: 3 Lomax Dig., 61; Loughton v. Atkins,

1 Pick. 545 (Mass. 1823).
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Thus it appears to have been early recognized that there might
be an implied revocation by a subsequent instrument making a
different disposition, even though the subsequent disposition were
ineffective. The holding of the case, that the will stands, is
seemingly in direct conflict with the dictum. The court carefully
took the case out of the operation of the dictum by stating an exception thereto: Whenever prior dispositions of property are complete,
and the words of the later instrument are precatory, the later
instrument will not be construed to revoke a former will. Had the
words of the codicil been mandatory, the will apparently would
have fallen and the residuary estate passed by intestacy."
The next case to consider implied revocation in West Virginia
presents the only actual law on the subject in this jurisdiction. In
Henry v. Haymond," a 1915 case, the court once again failed to
mention the revocation statute and applied the common law
theory of implied revocation. In this case testator was twice
married and had children by both wives. He executed a will,
naming severally the children of his first wife and stated they
had received all he intended them to have. By the residuary clause
he gave the remainder of his estate to the children by his second
wife. Two years later, testator executed a codicil to his will
whereby he devised specific property to the several children by his
second wife, and the remainder to them in the residuary clause.
The court held that the codicil "is a substitute for and a complete
revocation of the previous residuary clause." . . . [I]t abrogates
it as completely as if the testator bad expressly revoked it ....
A
subsequent inconsistent disposition of property, previously devised
is an implied revocation pro tanto."' 4 This case leaves no doubt
that implied revocation existed at its decision.
Implied revocation, standing alone, is of little other than academic
import. The problems that arise can be solved with little difficulty
at probate. However, when implied revocation is linked with the
problem of revival, a thorough understanding of both implied
revocation and revival is necessary, because a concrete problem,
fraught with undersirable consequences may easily arise.
II Id. at Syllabus No. 3.

277 W. Va. 173, 87 S.E. 78 (1915).
1-Id.
at 174, 87 S.E. at 78.
'4 1d. at 177, 87 S.E. at 79.
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It appears that under the dictum of the Carpenter case, and the
law of the Henry case, implied revocation does exist in West
Virginia. Thus the question causing practical concern becomes:
Recognizing implied revocation, when does it occur?
In the Henry case, by using the phraseology, "is a complete
revocation" and "abrogates . . . completely as if . . . expressly
revoked.. ." the court appears to say that such revocation occurs
at the execution of the subsequent inconsistent instrument. Such is
the rule in Kentucky under a similar statute,'5 and until recently
was the Virginia rule.'"
It would appear safe at this point to conclude that West Virginia
has implied revocation and that it is effective at execution. However, in proceeding one step further, Swann v. Swann,'" a 1948
case, is found, which by dictum flatly denies the existence of
implied revocation, at least as to partial inconsistency, in West
Virginia. The court states: "[I]mplied revocation is precluded as a
recognized
principle by the express language of our applicable
8
statute."'
If, then, revocation is based purely on a statutory interpretation,
ignoring the common law theory of implied revocation, and
revival,'9 as is generally conceded, is purely statutory, what occurs
when there are two wills, with inconsistent dispositions as to part,
the latter containing no express clause of revocation? The situation
more commonly arises in this manner: T executes a will devising
Blackacre to A, and Whiteacre to B. Subsequently, T executes a
codicil devising Blackacre to B, which does not contain an express
revocatory clause. If this were the situation at T's death, simply
enough, Blackacre and Wihiteacre would pass to B. But, prior to
T's death what is the state of T's devise of Blackacre to A in the
will? To give the problem a practical bent, suppose that after the
above executions, T executes an instrument expressly revoking the
codicil.
15
Slaughter's Adm'r v. Wyman, 228 Ky. 226, 14 S.E.2d 777 (1929).
' 6 Rudisills Ex'r v. Rhodes, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 147 (1877). Overruled
by Timerlake v. State-Planters Bank, 201 Va. 950, 115 S.E.2d 39 (1960).
17 13 W. Va. 555, 48 S.E.2d 425 (1948).
8
'
d at 559, 48 S.E.2d at 428.
19W. VA. CODE ch. 41, art. 1, § 8 (Michie 1961) reads: "No will or
codicil, or any part thereof, which shall be in any manner revoked, shall be
revived otherwise than by the reexecution thereof, or by a codicil executed in
the manner hereinbefore required, and then only to the extent to which an
intention to revive the same is shown." Virginia has an identical statute. VA.
CODE § 64-60 (Michie 1950). Kentucky has a similar statute. Ky. REV. STAT.

Aix. § 394.100 (1963).
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Under the Kentucky" and former Virginia2 ' view, the execution
of the codicil devising Blackacre to B would impliedly revoke the
devise to A contained in the will-at execution, and the subsequent
revocation of the codicil would cause Blackacre to pass by intestacy,
Whiteacre passing by valid devise under the will. A devise or
bequest once revoked may be revived only in the statutory
22
manner.
In West Virginia, however, a different result may occur due to
the Swann case.23 Here, in a factual situation containing a will
hoped by appellees to have been revoked by a property settlement,
impliedly or otherwise, the court rejected implied revocation. In
a paragraph at the end of the opinion, Judge Kenna states:
"There is some confusion in the decided cases arising from the
discussion of revocation of a whole instrument and what is
termed revocation of only a repugnant specific provision, as,
for example, by making a subsequent different disposition of
the same property. The latter is spoken of in Henry v. Haymond
...

as being an implied revocation; thus, perhaps, creating some

confusion if considered in the light of the cases discussing the
general rule of implied revocation as it related to the instrument
as a whole. It would seem that the subsequent different disposition of property without reference to a former devise, or
bequest thereof does not erase the first provision nor have the
effect of making it invalid: it simply nullifies its effect by
eliminating its object. In short it countermands rather than
revokes." (Emphasis added.)"
What is the effect of such dictum on the hypothetical situation?
T's devise by the codicil apparently "eliminates" the object of the
same devise in the will, and yet does not "revoke" such devise. The
use of such terminology as "eliminate" and "nullifies" appears
final; yet, if this were the case, the above would be a mere exercise
in semantics. However, such words as "countermand rather than
revoke" would seem to put the wording outside the statute and
keep such devise, though presently a "nullity," in a state of sus20

Op.

cit. supra note 15.

cit. supra note 16.
cit. supra note 19.
23 Op. cit. supra note 17.
24
Op. cit. supra note 17, at pages 561, 562, 48 S.E.2d
2" O
22 Op.
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pended animation. Briefly, if the devise is not revoked, it lives
as a possibility-at least until T's death.
If this view be accepted, the Swam dictum is easily applied
to the hypothetical situation as permitting the first will to stand
in toto, Blackaere passing to A, and Whiteacre to B.
The reasoning here appears to be that a will, unless specifically,
statutorily revoked, is ambulatory until death, and therefore a valid
expression of T's will. Thus, an inconsistent disposition "blots out"
the first devise until it either is removed, or T dies. This would
seem to fall in with the other theories of attempting to force the
decedent to die testate if he has once made a will, such as dependent relative revocation. That whole train of reasoning appears
fallacious, however, in the light of such decisions as Finely v.
5 an early
Howell,"
Georgia case. In this case, two wills were
admitted to probate, the one later in time being expressly revoked.
The court stated that the second will, though at one time testator's
wish, is expressly revoked and of no effect. As to the first will,
it previously was the testator's wish, but it was superseded by the
second will. The point is simply this: Merely because a second or
later will is revoked, why should it be presumed that the testator
would prefer his property to pass by the first will? If there were
but two means of disposition of an estate, then such a conclusion
would be logical in that revoking one, testator returned to the
other. However, in each case the possible schemes of disposition
are legion.
In a recent Virginia case, Timberlake v. State Planters Bank,"6
the Virginia court fell victim to reasoning similar to that of the
Swann dictum, although on a more tenuous ground. In this case,
testatrix executed two wills, the latter containing a clause expressly
revoking the former. She deposited both in a bank, and later
withdrew the second and revoking will, saying that she was going
to execute a new will. The new will was never found, nor was
the revoking will. The court allowed the first will to probate, presuming the second to be revoked animo revocandi."' In reaching
a three-two decision, the majority stated:
2-529 Ga. 514 (1859).
26 201 Va. 950, 115 S.E.2d

39 (1960); 63 W. VA. L. REv. 86 (1960); 18
WAsE. & IE L. REv. 166 (1961).
27Tate v. Wren, 185 Va. 773, 784, 40 S.E.2d 188, 193 (1946).
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"[Wlhen a revocation of a prior will is made under the
statute, § 64-59, by a subsequent will, the revocation clause
speaks, not at the time of the execution of the will, but at the
death of the testator; and if in the testator's lifetime he destroys
or cancels the revoking will with the intent to revoke it, the
revocation provision falls with the will and is not effective to
revoke the prior will." "
It now appears that under the Virginia statute as interpreted by
Timberlake, it is impossible to revoke effectively a will at any
time prior to death, in any fashion not limited to physical mutilation
or destruction. To pursue this further, there is a Virginia statute
concerning construction of wills which reads:
"A will shall be construed, with reference to the real and
personal estate comprised in it, to speak and take effect as if
it had been executed immediately before the death of the
testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will."
(Emphasis added.)29
It would seem that the words "hereby expressly revoking any
and all wills and/or codicils by me at any time heretofore made" °
express such contrary intention. The Virginia decision ignored this
statute.
In West Virginia there is one case, decided after Swann, which
mentions implied revocation. That is Nelson v. Ratliffe 1 a 1952
case, wherein testatrix executed a will, and subsequently, desiring
to execute another, struck out certain portions of the existing will
as a draft. A portion struck out was the signature of testatrix. The
court held that the requisite of intent was not present and admitted
the will to probate. In so holding, Judge Lovins stated:
"A will or other testamentary paper may be expressly or impliedly revoked. A testamentary disposition of property may be
impliedly revoked 'by the testator, or some person in his presence
and by his direction, cutting32 . .. obliterating the signature
thereto with intent to revoke."'
Op. cit. supranote 26, at page 957, 958, 115 S.E.2d at 44.
VA. CODE: § 64-62 (Michie 1950). West Virginia formerly bad the
same statute, but the words "real and personal" bave been deleted. W. VA.
CODE3 0ch. 41, art. 3, § 1 (Michie 1961).
Op. cit. supra note 26, at 951, 115 S.E.2d at 40.
31 137 W. Va. 27, 69 S.E.2d 217 (1952).
32 Id. at 34, 69 S.E.2d at 221.
28

29
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The type of revocation contemplated by this quotation is manifested by an affirmative act on the part of the testator or his agent.
There is no implication involved in the revocatory sense-there is
an affirmative, physical act.
CONCLUSION

From the standpoint of case law, it appears that implied revocation of an instrument totally inconsistent with a later disposition
exists in West Virginia. 3 However, implied revocation as to part
of an instrument differing with a later disposition is confused.
The law would seem to be that implied revocation pro tanto does
exist under the Henry case, but that it is in danger from the
dictum of the Swann case, and the misunderstanding of Nelson v.
Ratliffe. What rationale can there be for sustaining life in a superseded instrument, whether there be an express revocatory clause or
not? What basis for distinction can be found for giving effect to
implied revocation of totally inconsistent instruments and refusing
its application to partially inconsistent instruments? Any inconsistent disposition should clearly manifest the intent and will of a
testator. The abolishment of implied revocation as to part would
serve only to muddy the waters of revocation which until Swann
were clear.

Charles Marion Love, M

33

Op. cit. supra note 4.
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